ABSTRACT. The essence of the issue, which is presented in this study, can be put into a question: is the process of formation of the civil society in Ukraine in postcommunist conditions in line with cause-and-effect relations as opposed to the makrosocial situation in the state? Referring to the assumption of Edward Shils (1994), the "society" is the component of the triad, the other elements of which are the "economy" and the "state" or a "political entity". A characteristic feature of the civil society is that its elements are interconnected due to the collective selfawareness of joint participation in the society and the awareness of co-responsibility for the common good. The article presents the analysis of the social movement referred to as Euromaidan/Majdan (2013 -2014 as an expression of civic activity, preceded by the intensity of discontent, claims, social unrest resulting from the economic and political crisis in the state.
Ukrainian imagined community 1
By proclaiming independence in 1991, Ukraine was formed as a territorial and political unit. The basis of belonging to the state has become a "civilian" category of citizenship rather than ethnicity. The concept of the "Soviet nation", based on the coexistence of different ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups, has been replaced by the concept of "the people of Ukraine" as a political nation 2 . Within the conditions of existing cultural, linguistic, religious, and political differences, the issue of national community, the widest awareness of "us" and the division between "us" and "them" becomes essentially important. The perception of Ukraine as the state and society divided by the language, political option, ethnicity, is present not only in Ukraine but also beyond its borders. Superficiality and often a simplistic perception of Ukraine is indicated, inter alia, by M. Riabczuk (2015, pp. 3-4) , as he writes that "In academic circles, there is consensus that: a) Ukraine is not divided clearly and unequivocally, or according to the characteristics of the language or ethnic groups; b) language, ethnicity and political orientations significantly correlate with each other, but do not overlap; c) it is difficult to identify a clear dividing line on the territory of Ukraine (...); and in the end, what is most important, d) the idea of the division of Ukraine is almost not supported (except for 1 The research results presented in this section are cited on the basis of the monograph "Between Ukrainianness And Sovietness. Ukrainians, Russians and Bulgarians in Zaporizhia", Nomos Publishing House, Krakow, 2015 . In 2007 , field research was conducted in Zaporizhia as a cultural borderland. The study involved multiethnic communities at the Zaporizhia, with a rural-urban division due to the nature of the settlement of certain villages by the representatives of the most numerous ethnic groups living in the area under research -the Ukrainians, Russians and Bulgarians. The overall number of in-depth interviews was 120. 2 The issue about the sources of the formation of nations: cultural, the foundation of which is genealogy, and political, as a community of citizens. Crimea) by the people of this country". If we talk about the divisions in Ukraine, they have neither the nature of the language, neither are they religious nor ethnic; the divisions are due to the recognized values.
Being a Ukrainian becomes a matter of choice, which is allowed by the concept of a political nation (see: Karnaukh, 2015) . The choice of being a Ukrainian is contingent on the values of post-modernity, which is subjectively determined by nationality. The analysis of field studies carried out in 2007-2010 at the Zaporizhia among multi-ethnic local communities has allowed to formulate the following conclusion:
The model of post-modern ethnicity recognizes ethnicity as a dynamic, variable phenomenon, i.e. such that is not granted to an individual once and for all. "Blood and soil" laws are the principles of modernism; in the post-modern model, "the law of the individual's will" governs, although will is also subject to certain objective conditions. The right approach will be to determine the Ukrainian nation as the state between communism and postmodernity (Karnaukh, 2015, p. 258) .
The above mentioned studies enabled to note the fact that the awareness of the Ukrainian origin among the people surveyed does not interfere with the frequent bivalence and even polivalence in the case of ethnic and cultural diversity on the border (see: Kłoskowska, 1996) . There is no conflict between the declaration of belonging to the Ukrainian nation and the fact that a person does not use the Ukrainian language, or does not know Ukrainian well, or the fact of his functioning on the verge of cultures (Karnaukh, 2015, p. 251) .
It seems that in the post-Soviet Ukraine the opposition of the Russian and Ukrainian idea is not the issue. In fact, the main line of a dispute takes place between the Ukrainian and the Soviet idea; it is evidenced by the fact that some of the people surveyed in the Zaporizhia identified themselves not as the Russians, Bulgarians or Ukrainians (having ethnic roots), but as the "Soviet people". The term homo sovieticus, used by Józef Tischner, comes to mind: "the client of communism, enslaved by the communist system, consumed goods that communism offered him. Three values were particularly important to him: work, share of power, self-esteem. Owing them to communism, homo sovieticus became addicted to communism; which does not mean that at some point he had not contributed to its overthrow" (1992, p. 125) .
People who have a sense of nostalgia for the Soviet era as well as people who positively evaluate some values of "socialism (communism)" are just an example of homo sovieticus described by Tischner. The citizens of the new state demanded and expected from the "new" political elite meeting these needs, which communism guaranteed; they expected something more, still waiting for help from the state, for the guarantee of stability and justice.
Man of the period of socialism was addicted to work, not only as a means of subsistence, but also due to the belief that there is "someone" who cares about the working man, which gave him a sense of security and indispensability. A man had a sense of belonging to the community, he was a member of the collective: "It might be that such 'socialization' restricted man's freedom, but gave it significance. A man knew what his life purpose was. Who he sacrificed himself to" (ibid, p. 126).
It was an illusion, which became rooted deeply in the consciousness of the people of that period. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, generations of communism (villagers slightly later -after the collapse of the collective farms in the mid-nineties) suddenly felt that they were "nobody's": only yesterday everyone was "socialized", and today he or she is "nobody's" (ibid). Therefore, can we be surprised by such, and no other, consciousness of the Ukrainian people? I agree with the following Hrycak's arguments:
In many ways, today's Ukraine is suffering from the same diseases as young independent states. (...) Yet, for many reasons Ukrainian problems are deeper and the tasks are more complex. The postcolonial legacy of Ukraine is determined by the fact that the Soviet Union was not only an empire, but also a totalitarian state. (...) If Ukraine had the experience of the interwar independence, as the Baltic republics, or at least remained outside the Soviet influence for a shorter period, as Galicia, then the degree of its Sovietization would be much weaker, and the suffering of the transition period less severe (2000, pp. 339-340) .
As for sharing of power, or at least the feeling of participation, homo sovieticus now feels that he is a "leaf tossed by the wind" (Tischner, 1992, p. 127) . The sense of dignity was lost, which disappeared along with the sense of "indispensability", "social stability" and "socialization". On the basis of the results of research, a certain thesis emerges that homo sovieticus is a man whose consciousness is determined by existence, i.e. in order to be, he has to have something 3 . The new state, due to the fact of not meeting (or not meeting in total) the commitment to provide basic needs of a citizen, lost the confidence of citizens, most of whom are guided by the principle of "pragmatism", by the principle of "conditional love" to the state.
The concept of homo sovieticus should be regarded as a certain ideal type, used for the purpose of research material analyses. This does not mean, however, that it does not exist in reality. Depending on certain circumstances, this mentality is featured by some Ukrainian citizens, especially by residents of the eastern and southern territories. Confirmation of this fact is not a bad thing. A different situation is when such a feeling becomes a cause of some choices: "Let us imagine that it is an election day. Homo sovieticus is faced with an either-or issue: either his being will determine his consciousness or his social being will determine his consciousness..." (Tischner, 1992, p. 129) .
The research in Zaporizhia showed that the state as an institution uniting its residents (citizens) continues to have a crucial meaning. Citizenship is a kind of contract between the nation and the state (Aleksander, 2010) . Citizenship is the institutional form of solidarity. "This term refers to a particular category of human relations, which can and should be clearly distinguished from the category of economic relations" (Szacki, 1997, p. 29) . It constitutes and expresses its full formal membership and ties between its owners and the national state; it bases on belonging to the state or the nation, or both, and provides the individual with an identity -a "citizen". It is a theoretical point of perceiving citizenship. In practice, there are those who, pointing to citizenship, do not feel more solidarity with fellow citizens and loyalty to the state. Indeed, having citizenship does not necessarily go hand in hand with the perception of ties with the entire multi-million nation and the state. However, in general, in the case of people surveyed in Zaporizhia, the concept of Anderson's (1997) "imagined community" proved to be true, confirmed not only in having a sense of relationship with the people of Ukraine and loyalty to the state, but also in the knowledge and acceptance of the values and ideas of symbolic culture of the given political community.
An important issue applies to people of ethnic origin. The sense of citizenship is not at odds with ethnic identity. In this sense, the sense of being a member of a nation lies in the constitutive patriotism, respecting the multiplicity of cultural forms of life at the simultaneous socialization of all citizens in the framework of a common political culture.
Therefore, the Ukrainian people, as a state nation, among the respondents is understood as a political community in which the members are related by will and by shared 3 It is perhaps too strong a word, but it reflects the mood of the subjects, how they see the surrounding reality. In 2012, the Razumkov Centre conducted an all-Ukrainian survey on "what is more important: freedom or prosperity?" 30.2% of respondents marked the answer "of course, both freedom and prosperity are important, but I could give up some of my rights and civic liberties for prosperity"; 37.3% chose the answer "of course, both freedom and prosperity are important, but I could endure some material difficulties in exchange for my own freedom and civil rights"; 32.5% of respondents feel they are a "leaf tossed by the wind" using Tischner's term; they were the ones who had difficulty answering the question: http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=611 (accessed: 16 March 2016). conviction to live within a certain political-state order. The nation is understood here, in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine (1996) , as a political community of citizens that are equal before the law, regardless of their social status, origin, language or religion, which means that political citizenship is separated from ethnic or cultural identity.
The real problem of Ukraine, according to the respondents, lies elsewhere and is not associated with the concept of the nation. It concerns macro-social determinants, which have a direct impact on the low level of patriotism of the Ukrainians. The lack of social security is the cause of a neutral or less significant attitude towards the implementation of cultural needs. Ethnicity or the feeling of being a member of the Ukrainian nation becomes a value only in a situation of a certain stability ("being determines consciousness"). Thus, the attitude of the Ukrainian citizens to the state and to the process of transformation is variable and is modified on the basis of different ideologies and socio-political and economic conditions.
Macrosocial situation in Ukraine
Referring to the assumption of Edward Shils (1994) , the "society" is the component of the triad, the other elements of which are the "economy" and the "state" or a "political entity". The economic situation, which is reflected, among other things, in the fall of Ukraine's position in the world rankings 4 , the high cost of living in the country (higher than in Poland or the US) and the returning fear for the future of oneself and one's family, makes the people immerse in a sense of lack of justice, which is not conducive to creating a community. The idea of justice includes the issues of an equitable distribution of wealth, equal opportunities in socio-economic life and equality before the law.
V. Jurchyszyn (2012, p. 38) in a report regarding the analysis of the economic situation in Ukraine and the prospects for 2012 says that "in Ukraine, due to the lack of consistency of reforms, weak economic dynamics, low motivation to work, the level of corruption is reinforced and of the social disbelief in the effectiveness of reforms". In the opinion poll carried out by Razumkov Centre about "believing in the success of reforms in Ukraine" in 2015, 30.3% of respondents marked "lack of faith", 32.2% -"lack of faith, but I still have hope", 25.6% marked the answer, which said "I generally believe, but I have doubts" and only 4.8% of respondents gave an affirmative answer 5 . According to public opinion polls of IRI Research Centre, in September 2015, 82% of respondents pointed to the deterioration of the economic situation in the state and 79% indicated the deterioration of the economic situation of their families 6 . Among the most important problems of Ukraine, in the opinion of the respondents, is "war in Donetsk" -60%, "corruption among state employees" -47%, unemployment -30%. According to respondents, the problem of relations with Russia (11%), the status of the Russian language (less than 1%) remain of secondary importance for Ukraine. On the other hand, the most important issues for the subjects were: price control - 184 55%, the war in Donetsk -35%, the decline in the Hryvnia exchange rate -34%, unemployment -34%, social policy -31%, corruption -24%, that is, problems of social justice.
To illustrate the proper financial position of Ukrainian families it should be indicated here what the minimum wage in 2015 was, and it was 1218 UAH (the exchange rate in March 2016 is 27 UAH per 1 US dollar). The government promised to raise the minimum wage to 1378 UAH, where the 13% increase in the minimum wage at a simultaneous 50% inflation seems quite symbolic. The difficulty of the situation deepens due to disparities in work sectors, to uneven distribution of wealth, taking into account, among other things, regional differences, i.e. industrial and non-industrial regions. The official rate of social inequality in Ukraine in 2014 was 28.2, which places Ukraine at a better position than Poland (34.9) or Russia (37.5). On the other hand, experts advise to interpret these results very carefully due to the extensive "grey zone" in Ukraine, the tax system, unfavourable for the citizens, and the level of corruption. According to the researchers, the Gini index, closest to the correct situation in Ukraine, is 42.3 7 . Referring to the previously cited Tischner's thesis (1992), without having a secure future, a sense of social justice, citizens are not able to fight for higher goals, such as the issues of culture and national consciousness 8 . The formation of civil society in Ukraine encounters an obstacle in the form of the oligarchs and the unreality of constitutional guarantees (cf. Riabczuk, 2015, pp. 240-250) . It is mainly about the apparent freedom of speech and democracy, the existence of double standards and other pathologies of democracy as the idea of freedom, equality and justice.
According to the information from Razumkov Centre (for 2012), the most important cause of socio-economic and political problems in Ukraine is high level of corruption (31.3% of respondents 9 ), in the second place there was the belief that the officials care about their own interests only and not about the interests of the state (18.2%), in the third position is ignoring the Constitution and other legal regulations by the representatives of the government (14.4%), the next position stated ineffective governance of the state due to the lack of competence of civil servants (13.3), whereas 4.1% of respondents indicated the imperfection of the Constitution of Ukraine 10 . Below I present the attitude of the citizens of Ukraine to democracy in the years 2004-2012 ( Table 1) . The third item is worth considering -what does it mean "for such a person like me it does not matter which system will be in the state" -does it reflect the civic passivity, that is, refraining from using the status of a "citizen" 11 , or is it a problem of faith in the power of one's own voice ( The overall assessment of democracy in Ukraine is 3 on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means dictatorship, 5 -democracy 12 . Controlling the media by the oligarchs, the fact that journalists do not initiate controversial topics, double standards in the law, corruptionpromote an internal dilemma. In such circumstances, there returns, not so much forgotten, Soviet fear and conviction of the powerlessness of grassroots initiatives. According to the data from Razumkov Centre, in 2008 only, 11.6% of citizens were involved in civic activities, and in 2013 this number was 8.1% 13 14 Of those who ticked the answer "no" to the question whether they are involved in civic activities. The community of fear and insecurity, the discourse of oppression, lack of trust in government institutions, weakened ability of the society to the grassroots initiatives, selforganization of people, mobilization for the implementation of some important tasks for the community, mutual aid, which is a basic feature of the civil society.
The discourse of oppression (Alexander, 2010) as a remnant of the previous communist regime, accompanying the Ukrainian society even after gaining the national independence, affects the weakness of social ties, promotes various inequalities and exclusivity of social relations.
The dissatisfaction with the weakness of the state is sometimes the reason for protests in defence of democracy and in defence of a better future for the people and their families, similarly as the Orange Revolution in 2004 and Euromaidan of 2013-2014 in Ukraine, or a cause of a complete withdrawal from political life. Below, the analysis will be presented of the social movement referred to as Euromaidan 16 as an expression of the civic activity, preceded by the intensity of discontent, claims, social unrest resulting from the economic and political crisis in the country.
Social resistance as an attempt to restore justice
As the starting point for the analysis concerning the creation of a civil society in Ukraine one can take the Orange Revolution of 2004 and Euromaidan of 2013-2014 as the social movements which are civil in nature.
I regard protest and participation in the social movement as the strength of the society and the fact of the citizens' using not only the rights arising from (legal) citizenship, but also as duties in the form of participation in social and political life. The fact of manifesting one's views, aspirations for change, expressing one's own opinion about the situation in the state is a sign of a sense of co-responsibility of the members of a particular society for the common good (regardless of the existing social differences), which is a necessary condition for the existence of a civil society (see: Shils, 1994) .
The participation in the social movement may be for different purposes: the defence of personal interests, or taking care of group interests, and at other times, the participation in the protest is almost accidental. The question is: to what extent a protest, a social movement is an attempt to restore order, security or justice, and to what extent these pose only a threat, dysfunctional social order, and the result of manipulation (cf. Sztompka, 2005, p. 285) .
It is certainly used to inform about certain irregularities in the functioning of the social system and social mobilization. On the one hand, protests and social movements strengthen the democratic order, while on the other hand, they may be a disintegrating force.
The protest at Maidan in Kiev in November 2013, referred to as "Euromaidan", as well as protests in other cities in the defence of European values for Ukraine was unexpected for both the government and the opposition. A characteristic feature of the several-weeks demonstrations, in my opinion, was that the opposition were unable to take full control of the protesters (the camp of the opposition could not unite; it was represented by three political parties, divided into different interests -Batkivshchyna, UDAR and Svoboda), which can, on the one hand, testify the grassroots initiative of the event, while on the other -confirms the thesis of mistrust in the political elites 17 . A special role in its creation and spread was played by the new media. This fact gives us a basis to conclude about who the first participants of Maidan were -we can talk about the first clear manifestation of the generation that was brought up in an independent country. They were educated people or studying 18 , who were looking for their own national identity and a better future for themselves and the state (see : Riabczuk, 2015, p. 243) . Is it possible at this point to determine the motif of the people participating in demonstrations? Ukraine's desire to enter into the EU structures. Such a reply would be too obvious and superficial. The participation in Euromaidan can be interpreted broadly as the idealistic belief that the association agreement will help restore the institutional and legal order in the country, that it will help eradicate corruption and restore constitutional guarantees, that it will improve the functioning of the Ukrainian state. The Association Agreement, according to experts, "was the last hope to rectify the situation in a peaceful manner, that is, to force government representatives to obey the law (to stop theft, lies and deception) and to make the European Union assist in this issue" (Riabczuk, 2015, p. 242) .
In 2011, public opinion polls, among the reasons that could stimulate Ukrainians to take part in legal protests (meetings, demonstrations, pickets), listed the following as the most important: price increases (42.5%), lack of payments (34.2%), low wages (29.2%), redundancy (26.9%), injustice and crime (21.6%), arbitrariness of local authorities (21.6%), defence of human rights (15.4%), foreign countries meddling in the Ukraine internal affairs (11.4%). 26% of respondents marked the category "under any circumstances"
19 . Thus, in the vast majority these are the reasons that fall within the concept of social justice. "Misery breeds rebellion" or more precisely, the misery that people are aware of and which they define as unfair, pushes them to revolt (see : Sztompka, 2005, p. 287) . By mass protests, the Ukrainians challenged the conditions in which they lived. The consciousness of poverty and the consciousness of oppression, the belief that the lack of justice are not the natural order of this world have become the impulse to revolt.
Earlier government strategies against the protesters or those manifesting their dissatisfaction, by waiting out or suppressing initiatives, including by administratively obstructing the possibility to organize demonstrations, failed. The attempt to beat peaceful demonstrators by force, which took place on November 30, 2013, by the special police branch, encountered a different reaction than the one assumed by the government. Instead of intimidating and therefore suppressing, there was a sharp increase in anti-government sentiments and those who had so far been only remotely watching the course of events, joined them. Euromaidan of November 21, 2013, reclassified into the "Revolution of dignity" as a political and social form of protest in defence of democratic freedoms and "dignified" living conditions (see: Kyrydon, 2015, p. 18) .
Retrospectively, questions can be asked and answers sought about what the identity of the protest movement was, who the protesters were? -the Ukrainians. What is meant by this term? Can the earlier event, the Orange Revolution of 2004, and the Maidan of 2013-2014 be seen as a symbol or even a chance for the state and the people of Ukraine to achieve civic and social activists, music stars, however, they lacked a leader and a clearly declared purpose, which, for example "organized" Maidan during the Orange Revolution in 2004. 18 In the first protests in Kiev, Lviv and other cities of Western Ukraine mainly students participated. The protests were peaceful and apolitical in nature. Symbols that accompanied the protesters were two flags, one -a state flag: blue and yellow and the European flag. An important role was played at that time by the social networks that enabled interacting, providing information, slogans calling to participate in the demonstrations that were passed in social media. Only later there appeared stages, as attempts to "technically" organize the protest, from which politicians and celebrities spoke. Then, there emerged several new groups and even movements, such as "Automaidan". After some time, a religious accent came into being -on the stages of Maidan church services were conducted. Characteristically, the priests were from the outside of the Moscow Patriarchate. national awareness, where the nation is conceived as a community of citizens regardless of the origin or language of everyday communication? A good proof of this is the language of Maidan, the participants of which had not only used modern techniques of communication, but both the Ukrainian and the Russian language (see: Kyrydon, 2015, p. 26) . Language issues did not play a role of dividing the participants into the "pro-Russian" and the "proUkrainian". The experts increasingly notice the lapidary nature of talking about the divisions in Ukraine due to the language and region of residence, and the need for a deeper grasp of these problems, that despite the divisions due to the recognized values and geopolitical views, in the nation of Ukraine there is something resembling the national consensus (see : Riabczuk, 2015, p. 247) . On the other hand, it leaves open the question of manipulation, for example, attempts to symbolically root the protesters into the national tradition (Zaporizhian Sich or UPA tradition). Manipulation (inter alia, from the Russian side and from the Yanukovych Family) consisted in strengthening harmful and polarizing stereotypes about the inhabitants of the eastern and western Ukraine 20 . Manipulation of the media has created a base for mutual misunderstanding, a conflict within the society, the source of which were cultural differences. But were there differences in consciousness? I have in mind the national consciousness, which I primarily understand through the prism of will (national solidarity, the awareness of being a member of the Ukrainian people, regardless of the nationality or the language of communication), then the culture. Thus, for example, during the years 2013-2014, the number of inhabitants of Ukraine, who first feel the citizens of Ukraine, increased almost by 20%: from 54% to 73%; people's identification due to their place of residence accordingly declined 21 . When presenting the image of people who actively or passively experienced the social movement described here, a few words should be said about those who remained on the other side, i.e. those who were "dissatisfied" with the Maidan. They were the villagers, workers, representatives of the older generation, mainly, but not exclusively residents of the largest industrial cities in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, who were primarily afraid of "worsening" the relations with Russia, of the economic sanctions, and thus, who feared the economic future of the region and their own. The revolution, as the interruption of social cohesion, is perceived here more as a defeat than a salvation for the state (cf. Sztompka, 2005, p. 281) . Half of the Ukrainians believe that the state will benefit from joining the EU, 25% believe that the state will lose and 24% do not have an explicit opinion on the subject. In all age categories the support for an association agreement with the EU prevails. In contrast, a regional difference is clearly visible: as long as the inhabitants of the western and central areas strongly support the agreement with the EU -77% and 57.5%, the inhabitants of the eastern and southern regions are less convinced of the positive impact of the European integration -30% and 35%. The basis for a negative assessment of the membership in the EU structures in the east and south are the concerns related to worsening the relations with Russia (35%), increase in unemployment (33%), lower living standards (30%) and the loss of the Russian market (17%) 22 23 . By contrast, most residents of the areas affected by conflict and social anxiety in Ukraine at the moment just want to "live normally". Postrevolutionary chaos makes it more difficult to meet the basic needs (cf. Sztompka, 2005, p. 287) . People are starting to dream of order and stability. The formation of a new political, social, economic order in Ukraine is a process, the end result of which remains open.
Summary. The release of mentality
By pondering in this article on the considerations related to the search for some causeand-effect relationships between the social rebellion and the macro-structural situation in the state, we cannot ignore psychological factors. For the structural theories, revolutions are the result of tensions in the social structure, but above all of the special configurations in relationships between citizens and the state (Sztompka, 2005, p. 290) . The causes of the revolution should be traced in particular at the social level, taking into account class and group relationships, and not in the citizens' heads, their mentality or attitudes (ibid). The structural theoretical and empirical orientation does not have to be in contradiction to the cultural orientation. It omits a thorough complex process that takes place "in between". Therefore, can mass protests in Ukraine of 2013-2014 and the accompanying changes be interpreted as a growing awareness of the community, co-responsibility of the Ukrainian citizens for the common good, or has the threshold of unbearable frustration, which led to the outbreak of spontaneous action been crossed? In my opinion, the macrostructural context played a key role here. It is the background for processes that occur at the micro level, that is, in the consciousness of individuals. According to A. Hulczyński, a Ukrainian economist, "the year of 1991, the Maidan in 2004 and Euromaidan share the same goals. They have the same roots, derived not only from the demand to recognize the independence of Ukraine, but also from a desire to put an end to the Soviet era, from the willingness to release our mentality from the remnants of totalitarianism" (quoted in Riabczuk, 2015, p. 243) . If these observations are correct, there is a gradual transition in Ukraine from materialistic to postmaterialistic values, i.e., referring to the title of the article: it is not being that determines consciousness (although it remains important), but it is consciousness that will determine the being of modern Ukraine and its people 24 .
